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Issues and Findings 
Discussed in this Brief: An evalu-
ation of the impact of two D.C. 
Superior Court experimental interven-
tions on drug-involved defendants in 
Washington. During the experiment, 
all drug felony defendants were 
randomly assigned to one of three 
dockets established to expedite the 
handling of drug cases. One drug-
case docket intervened in the 
standard manner. Another docket 
intervened through a new compre-
hensive treatment program. The 
third offered an experimental pro-
gram mandating a graduated sched-
ule of sanctions if the defendant 
failed compulsory drug tests. 
Key issues: Researchers measured 
the impact of the programs on de-
fendants' drug use, criminal activity, 
and social and economic functioning 
using court records and self-report 
data from a survey of defendants. 
The study also examined program 
costs and estimated the value of 
benefits in the form of averted costs 
of victimization, arrest, prosecution, 
and incarceration. 
Key findings: Among the impact 
evaluation findings are the following: 
• Sanctions program participants 
were significantly less likely than the 
standard docket sample to be arrested 
in the year following sentencing. 
• Assignment to dockets offering 
the experimental programs signifi-
cantly reduced defendants' drug use 
Jretrial release. The reduc-




Evaluation of the D.C. Superior 
Court Drug lnteiVention Programs 
By Adele Harrell, Shannon Cavanagh, and John Roman 
In 1993, the Washington, D.C., Superior 
Court embarked on an ambitious experi-
ment to test court-based interventions for 
drug-involved defendants.1 During the 
experiment, all drug felony defendants were 
randomly assigned to one of three dockets 
the court had established in 1992 to expe-
dite the handling of drug cases. Each 
docket offered different services as follows: 
• The standard docket continued to handle 
drug cases in a routine manner (which 
included twice-weekly drug tests and 
judicial monitoring), while the other 
two offered new intervention services 
in addition to drug testing and judicial 
monitoring. 
• The treatment docket intervened with 
a comprehensive treatment program 
designed to provide drug-involved in-
dividuals with the skills, self-esteem, 
and community resources necessary to 
help them leave the criminal life. 
• The sanctions docket penalized 
participants for failing drug tests and 
encouraged them to enter treatment, 
if needed. Failure to appear and test 
drug-free twice each week resulted in 
the swift and certain application of 
clearly defined penalties. Under this 
sanctions approach, defendants re-
ceived case management and were 
referred to community-based treatment, 
if needed or desired. 
The Center for Substance Abuse Treat-
ment and the National Institute of Justice 
funded an evaluation to examine the pro-
grams' impact on eligible defendants-
the target group-and those who agreed 
to participate in the two intervention ser-
vices. Key components common to all 
three dockets were early intervention, fre-
quent drug testing, judicial monitoring of 
each defendant's progress, and a comput-
erized system that provided judges imme-
diate access to defendants' drug test 
results. 
The study found reductions in drug use 
during pretrial release for defendants in 
both experimental dockets, reductions in 
arrests during the year after sentencing 
for sanctions program participants, and 
reductions in drug-related social prob-
lems for treatment program participants. 
Supporting research 
Specialized drug dockets, often in the 
form of drug courts, have emerged in a 
number of jurisdictions, supported by 
research indicating that: 
• Drug use is directly linked to 
crime. Drug-using offenders are 
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Issues and Findings 
continued., . 
when program participants were 
compared to the standard docket 
sample. 
• Sanctions program participants 
who attended Narcotics Anony-
mous/Alcoholics Anonymous during 
the program period had a signifi-
cantly lower likelihood of heroin 
and/or cocaine use in the year after 
sentencing. 
• Treatment program participants 
reported significantly fewer drug-
related social problems than stan-
dard docket participants in the year 
after sentencing. However, sanction 
docket defendants did not report 
similar reductions in drug-related 
social problems. 
• Sanction program participants said 
agreeing in advance to the sanctions 
and the rules for applying penalties 
gave them a feeling of control. 
• The twice-weekly drug tests 
proved to be a relatively inexpensive 
strategy for screening defendants for 
drug use in a timely manner. Using 
tests as a screening process enabled 
the intervention programs to devote 
their staff resources to known users. 
• The significant reductions in ar-
rests among sanctions program 
participants resulted in a total net 
benefit of $713,570, savings of 
about $2 for every $1 in program 
costs. 
Target audience: Federal, State, and 
local court administrators and judges; 
State and local government adminis-
trators; State and local police agen-
cies; drug treatment programs; and 
researchers. 
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intervention I rogram 
involved in hig 
ity; the frequency and seventy ot their 
criminal behavior grows as their drug 
use increases.2 Drug addicts commit as 
much as four to six times more crimes 
while using drugs than when they are 
not abusing narcotics, a pattern that is 
even more pronounced among habitual 
offenders.:l, 4 
• Higher rates of arrests, stricter 
laws, and 1nore aggressive sentenc-
ing policies do not deter many drug 
users exposed to these penalties. 
This leads to a revolving door scenmio in 
which <hug-involved offender,; appear 
repeatedly before the courts. One study 
found 60 percent of opiate-dependent 
Federal parolees were reincarcerated 
within 6 months of release--vi1tually 
all for narcotics-related <Times-at an 
incarceration cost of more than $27,000 
per person, per year." 
• Contt·ary to popular opinion, drug 
treatment is effective-not for every-
one and not all the time, but, on average, 
it works. The Drug Abuse Treatment 
Outcome Study (DATOS) showed that 
the percentage of regular cocaine users 
dropped from 66 percent in the year be-
fin·e treatment to 22 percent in the year 
after treatment among those receiving 
long-term residential treatment, while 
the percentage reporting predatmy illegal 
activity dmpped from 41 percent to 
16 percent. The National Treatment 
Improvement Evaluation Study f(mnd 
40 percent to 50 pereent of regular co-
caine and heroin users who spent at 
least 3 months in treatment were almost 
<hug-free in the year after treatment, 
regardless of the treatment type. This 
5-year study of more than 4,000 drug 
treatment clients found large and signifi-
cant decreases in their alcohol and drug 
use, criminal activity, AIDS risk , and 
homelessnes;> a)l.d in~r~are!i j11, tbrjr ,., . , 
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me, and physical and 
mental neann 1 year after discharge. At 
least three major studies indicate that 
clients who stayed in drug treatment for 
3 months or longer reported greater re-
ductions in <hug use than those who 
received less treatment, regardless of 
treatment type.r' 
• Criminal justice intervention with 
drug-involved offenders can in-
crease participation in tt·eatment 
and reduce crime. Studies from 
the California Civil Addict Program, 
community-based methadone mainte-
nance programs, therape uti c commu-
nities, and drug court outpatient 
programs found lower crime rates 
among offenclers who received drug 
treatment. 7 An American University 
survey of the 200 oldest drug courts 
found that 70 percent of those offenders 
who entered the programs remained 
active in treatment at the end of I 
year.B In Dade County, Florida, drug 
court defendants were less likely to 
recidivate and had longer periods to 
rearrest than other felony drug defen-
dants.9 Treatment combined with uri-
nalysis and court monitoring with 
sanctions is more likely to be 
successful than treatment alone.w 
• Criminal justice intervention is a 
good investment of publie funds. 
The Honolulu Drug Court in Hawaii 
estimated it saved between $677,000 
and $854,000 per year in averted prison 
costs for offenders who would have 
been incarcerated if not successfully 
treated. 11 The Multnomah County Drug 
Court in Oregon saved nearly $2.5 mil-
lion per year in criminal justice costs. 
When savings in victimization, theft re-
duction, public assistance, ancl medical 
costs were added, the payoff rose to a 
little more than $10 million per year. 12 
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Identifying defendants for 
drug interventions 
Defendants arrested on felony drug 
charges were randomly assigned to one 
of the three drug dockets prior to their 
first court appearance. Docket assign-
ment was made prior to determining 
defendants' program eligibility. 
On each of the three dockets, defen-
dants were offered a plea at an early 
hearing. Pleas were not negotiated after 
the first offer. If the defendant accepted 
the offer, he or she remained on the 
docket, and the same judge handled the 
case throughout pretrial and sentenc-
ing. If the defendant refused to accept 
the plea offer, he or she was assigned to 
a separate trial docket. Status hearings 
occuned about once a month, and de-
fendants could be identified as eligible 
at any one of these hearings.13 Case 
processing proceeded as usual and if 
and when a defendant on one of the 
two experimental intervention dockets 
(treatment or sanctions) exhibited 
drug problems, the intervention was 
offered. 
Drug testing was the primary means 
used to identify drug-using defendants. 
The process is illustrated in exhibit l. 
Detained anestees were routinely 
tested for drugs by the Pretrial Services 
Agency (PSA), usually within 24 hours 
of anest. Positive drug tests or reports 
of cunent drug use on a PSA intake 
interview resulted in mandatory twice-
weekly drug testing as a condition of 
release. PSA staff regularly reviewed 
defendants' test results prior to each 
hearing and flagged the files of those 
defendants who tested positive for 
drugs at arrest and failed two subse-
quent drug tests as eligible for inter-
vention. Drug test failures included 
positive tests, missed tests, and submis-
sion of tampered urine samples.14 
Exhibit 1. Case identification for Superior Court Drug Intervention Program (SCDIP) 
Arrest on a Drug Felony Charge 
~ 
Initial Drug Test at Jail 
(24-72 hours after arrest) 
~ 
Random Assignment* 
(to 1 of 3 SCDIP dockets) 
~ 
First Appearance: 
Sets Conditions of Release: 
(large majority released on own recognizance) 
/ ~ 
If initial post-pretrial release drug test 
1 
If released and initial drug test 
positive, 2x per week drug test r~qu1red negative, no subsequent testing required 
~ ~ 
Regular hearings** on assigned 
Regular hearings** on assigned SCDIP docket 
SCDIP docket 
Eligible for SCDIP as soon as 2 post-release 
Eligible for SCDIP if judge finds evidence drug tests are skipped or positive 
(about 40% on each docket) of drug use during hearings 
*Defendants were not allowed to transfer to another SCDIP docket. 
**Plea offers were made at regular docket hearings and could occur before, after, or at the same time a 
defendant became eligible for SCDIP, and the program offer was not contingent upon acceptance of the 
plea. However, if the plea was rejected, defendants transferred out of the SCDIP dockets to a trial docket. 
Drug testing took place at PSA's 
highly automated laboratory in the 
court house. The laboratory used 
EMIT urinalysis to test for a full 
screen of drugs-cocaine, marijuana, 
PCP, and heroin. 15 The state-of-the-art 
technology included picture identifica-
tion of defendants, supervised submis-
sion of samples with a guaranteed 
chain of custody, and quality control 
procedures managed by an onsite 
laboratory supervisor. Test results 
were automatically entered into a 
sophisticated computer program that 
had information on the defendant and 




within 30 minutes via computers at the 
bench in each courtroom. Judges on 
all three dockets frequently referred to 
their computers during hearings. Dis-
puted results were confirmed by gas 
chromatography. 
Defendants were dropped from the 
program if their case was dismissed 
or they transfened to a trial docket less 
than 30 days after becoming eligible 
(the percentage of cases going to trial 
was less than 5 percent and did not 
differ significantly by docket). A few 
defendants in the treatment program 
continued in treatment while they 
';'\ 
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appeared on the trial docket but were 
not included in the evaluation sample. 
Exhibit 2 compares the intervention 
services and case handling practices 
of the three dockets during the demon-
stration program. 
The standard docket 
Standard case processing for drug felony 
defendants in D.C. Superior Court in-
cluded twice-weekly drug testing and ju-
dicial monitoring of the results. Current 
computerized drug test information was 
available at the judge's bench at each 
hearing. The standard docket judges 
typically encouraged defendants who 
tested positive or missed tests to seek 
treatment but did not provide case man-
agement staff to assist them and did not 
levy sanctions for test failures. Cases of 
Exhibit 2. Comparison of the three Superior Court Drug Intervention Programs (SCDIP) 
Sanctions Program Treatment Program 
(240 participants, (140 participants, 
125 nonparticipants) 206 nonparticipants) Standard Docket 
Intervention • Drug tests-2x per week • Drug tests-3-5x per week • Drug tests-2x per week 
Content • Judicial monitoring • Judicial monitoring • Judicial monitoring 
• Court-imposed penalties for • Daily intensive outpatient drug • Voluntary participation in community-
bad drug tests treatment in court-based program based treatment encouraged 
• Case manager assisted entry into • Court penalties or termination from 
community-based treatment as the program for repeated violation 
needed of treatment program rules 
• Progression and graduation 
ceremonies for success 
Intervention • Average number of days • Average number of days 
Delivery to to program entry 64 to program entry 92 
Participants • Accepted program offer 66% • Accepted program offer 40% 
• Average number of days • Average number of days 
in program 132 in program 188 
• Average number of • Total number of progression, 
sanction hearings 4.7 compliance, and graduation 
ceremonies 9.5 
• Number of all • Number of all • Number of all 
hearings average 12.5 hearings average 15.6 hearings average 6.8 
• Median number of days • Median number of days • Median number of days 
to case disposition 251 to case disposition 394 to case disposition 223 
• Total number of sanctions • Percentage of scheduled 
imposed 437 treatment days attended 36% 
3 days in jury box 182 
3 days in jail 121 
5-7 days in detox 82 
7 days in jail 52 
• Percentage who dropped • Percentage who dropped • Percentage who dropped 
out of drug testing 38% out of drug testing 50% out of drug testing 41% 
• Self-reported drug or • Self-reported drug or • Self-reported drug or 
alcohol treatment during alcohol treatment during alcohol treatment during 
pretrial period 82% pretrial period 97% pretrial period 74% 
Residential treatment Residential treatment Residential treatment 
(referred by program) 13% (referred by program) 8% (referred by program) 6% 
Detox 63% Detox 48% Detox 33% 
NNAA 60% NNAA 73% NNAA 63% 
Outpatient 26% Outpatient 36% Outpatient 26% 
Methadone 17% Methadone 3% Methadone 7% 
Partial/day program 17% Partial/day program 30% Partial/day program 12% 
Other 31% Other 52% Other 25% 
• 4 •• 
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Evaluation of drug courts 
!though the D.C. Superior Court 
Drug Intervention Programs were not con-
sidered a drug court, they shared many key 
elements with drug courts, such as frequent 
urinalysis and judicial supervision. The court 
now runs a conventional drug court that 
combines the treatment and sanctions 
programs into a single program. To better 
understand drug courts in both policy and 
practice, the National institute of Justice and 
the Drug Court Program Office have funded 
research into how they function and their 
effects upon defendant populations. 
In 1997 and 1998, NIJ and DCPO jointly 
funded the first evaluations of four older 
drug court programs in Portland, Oregon; 
Las Vegas, Nevada; Pensacola, Florida; and 
Kansas City, Missouri. These sites were se-
lected for two-phase evaluations. The first 
phase included a process evaluation of these 
programs, as well as an examination of 
those defendants (who would have been 
eligible for inte1vention on the basis of 
two failed drug tests after pretrial re-
lease) reached disposition in about 
7.5 months (233 days) and averaged 
6.8 hearings. Many of these defendants 
voluntarily participated in community-
based treatment programs during pretrial 
release, primarily Narcotics Anonymous/ 
Alcoholics Anonymous (NA/AA) meet-
ings. One-third repmted attending 
detoxification services, and one-quarter 
reported receiving outpatient treatment. 
Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) were 
sentenced to probation, including 88 
percent of those who tested dmg free 
in the month before sentencing and 63 
percent o[ those who tested positive or 
skipped drug tests in the month before 
sentencing. 
criminal recidivism of drug court participants. 
A report of the results of this research will 
be published in late 2000. The second 
phase of these grants is presently under way 
and is examining participant retention in 
treatment, changes in drug court partici-
pants' lifestyles, and cost benefits of these 
programs. Results for these second-phase 
programs will be available in 2001. 
Later in 1998, in response to another solici-
tation, NIJ and DCPO funded a grant to 
examine 14 drug courts funded by DCPO 
in 1995 and 1996 under the Crime Act of 
1994. This grant was designed for two 
phases of research. The first phase was to 
develop a framework for describing the 
structural components of drug court pro-
grams and should be completed late in 
2000. The second phase will evaluate 
program impacts of these courts. 
The graduated sanctions 
program 
Defendants eligible for the graduated 
sanctions program were offered a greatly 
increased chance of receiving probation 
rather than incarceration at sentencing 
for successful program completion. 
Two-thirds of the eligible defendants ac-
cepted the offer. Based on data from the 
postsentem:ing focus group, def(~ndants' 
decisions to join the sanctions program 
appeared to be motivated by their desire 
to avoid incarceration. Despite concerns 
about the risks of sanctions, most eligihle 
defendants ami their defense attorneys 
were attracted by the increased likelihood 
the defendant would be placed on pro-
bation instead of being sentenced to 
incarceration. 
• • 5 • • 
Defendants entered the program about 
2 months (64 days) after arrest. At 
program acceptance, participants 
signed contracts agreeing to submit 
to twice-weekly urinalysis tests and 
report to court for sanctioning if they 
tested positive, submitted a tampered 
sample, or skipped a test. Sanctions 
included 3 days in the jury box for the 
first infraction, 3 days in jail for the 
second infraction, 7 days in detoxifica-
tion for the third infraction, and 7 days 
in jail for subsequent infractions. 
The graduated sanctions program em-
phasized the swiftness and certainty of 
the sanction imposed. 
• Swiftness. Each defendant was 
tested for a full screen of illegal 
drugs-cocaine, marijuana, PCP, 
and heroin. Participants were in-
structed to call a pretrial service 
officer the evening of their drug test 
to learn the results. If a participant 
tested positive, he or she was in-
structed to come before the judge 
the following day for a compliance 
hearing. If a participant failed to 
appear for the hearing, a bench 
warrant for arrest was i~;sued. 
• Certainty. Ninety-seven percent 
of the positive drug tests resulted in 
a scheduled compliance hearing. 
Excuses were accepted at 16 per-
cent of the hearings. The judges ad-
hered to the sanction plan moc;t of 
the time, although a few defendants 
rec!~ived the first sanction of 3 clays 
in the jury box more than once, 
and some defendants were sent to 
detoxification before tht-' third sanc-
tion, generally at their own request. 
In I he f()(:us t,'Toup, program pmticipants 
said they agreed in advance lo the sanc-
tions and the rules lin· applying penalties 
because they felt it gave them control. 
•• Research in Brie •• 
These defendants knew they could avoid 
penalties by not using drugs, and it was 
their responsibility to show the judge 
they were clean through drug test results. 
Because the sanctioning rules were 
simple and clearly explained in advance, 
defendants viewed the penalties they 
received as fair. 
Participants were significantly more likely 
than standard docket eligibles to receive 
detoxification during the program but 
otherwise resembled the standard docket 
eligibles in their use of community-
based treatment. Sixty percent of the 
participants reported attending NA/AA 
during the program, as did 63 percent of 
those on the standard docket. 
Graduated sanctions program participa-
tion averaged about 4.5 months (132 
days) and required an average of 4. 7 
sanction hearings per participant, impos-
ing a total of 437 sanctions. Participants' 
cases remained open about 28 days 
longer than cases of eligible defendants 
on the standard docket (based on the me-
dian number of days to case disposition). 
Although the overall rate of defendants 
receiving probation was 65 percent on 
the sanctions and standard dockets, 
those who tested clean in the month be-
fore sentencing increased their chances 
of probation. Of those who were clean, 
95 percent of both groups received pro-
bation (some had prior criminal histories 
that precluded probation) compared 
to 56 percent who never participated, 
dropped out of testing, or tested positive 
for drugs during the month before 
sentencing. 
The treatment program 
Eligible defendants on the treatment 
docket were offered an intensive day 
treatment program and were told suc-
cessful completion would greatly in-
crease the likelihood they would be 
placed on probation rather than incar-
cerated at sentencing. Those who 
accepted this offer entered treatment 
about 3 months (92 days) after arrest. 
Less than half (40 percent) of the eli-
gible defendants agreed to join the pro-
gram. The defendants' reluctance to join 
the program stemmed from its require-
ment that they attend treatment 3 to 5 
days each week. For some, this con-
flicted with work and child care respon-
sibilities. Others wanted less intensive 
treatment. 
One lesson from the high rate of 
nonparticipation is that multiple treat-
ment options are needed because drug-
involved defendants vary widely in the 
severity of their drug abuse. The court 
subsequently broadened the treatment 
options for drug-involved offenders, 
placing a large percentage of them in 
a highly focused day reporting program 
of several hours each week and reserving 
more intensive treatment for those who 
were more severely addicted to drugs. 
The treatment program was based on 10 
treatment modules that included group 
education, group and individual coun-
seling, drug testing, and acupuncture. 
Clients moved through sequential treat-
ment stages, which consisted of an 
orientation phase and a five-level in-
tensive treatment phase toward gradua-
tion. Progression through the program 
was contingent upon the participants' 
progress toward the objectives outlined 
in the treatment plan. For the first year, 
the program met 5 days per week from 
9 a.m. to 3 p.m. Subsequently, it shifted 
to shorter hours and 3 days per week. 
Defendants' movement from one level 
to the next was designed as a reward for 
positive behavior and to acknowledge 
the completion of 21 days of treatment. 
The treatment team reviewed the defen-
dants' progress and made recommenda-
•• • 6 •• 
tions for movement to the next level to 
the judge. The treatment staff imposed 
penalties for nonattendance, tardiness, 
and behavior problems in treatment but 
not for positive drug tests, which were 
handled by judges. Judicial admonish-
ment and program termination were 
used to respond to persistent, serious 
problems. Progression to the next level 
was celebrated in a court ceremony 
during which the judge congratulated 
defendants for their success and pre-
sented small gifts to recognize their 
achievement of treatment goals. Treat-
ment graduates were honored with 
certificates presented by the judge in 
courtroom ceremonies attended by 
friends, family members, fellow pro-
gram participants, and staff from the 
court and treatment program. 
Treatment participation averaged about 
6.3 months (188 days). The program 
participants averaged 9.5 more hearings 
(progression and compliance hearings) 
than eligible defendants on the standard 
docket. Participants' cases remained 
open 171 days longer than defendants' 
cases on the standard docket due to the 
duration of the treatment program and a 
longer period before program entry. 
Overall, 19 percent of the 140 partici-
pants graduated from the treatment pro-
gram, and 9 percent left the program 
doing well (there were an additional 
206 nonparticipants in the docket). 
The remainder were terminated as 
unsuccessful, absconded, or, in some 
cases, were transferred to other treat-
ment programs. As was the case with the 
standard docket eligibles, about two-
thirds of the participants, regardless of 
completion status, received probation. 
The treatment program suffered substan-
tial operational problems and was re-
peatedly forced to close due to flooding, 
heating problems, and poor ventilation. 
• Research in Brief I 
District financial problems meant ser-
vice components such as health screen-
ing, literacy training, and other support 
services could not be purchased. Partici-
pants attended a little more than one-
third of the scheduled treatment days. 
Thus, the impact analysis does not test 
the effect of treatment under optimal 
conditions. A significant lesson for 
courts planning drug treatment linkages 
is that procedures for monitoring treat-
ment quality need to be established. 
The impact evaluation 
The graduated sanctions program and 
the treatment program were each inde-
pendently compared to the standard 
docket that offered only drug testing 
and judicial monitoring. The evalua-
tion examined the impact of the pro-
grams on eligible defendants-the 
target group of defendants-and on 
the subset of eligible defendants who 
agreed to participate in the two pro-
grams, as shown in exhibit 3. 
The evaluation samples consisted of all 
eligible defendants randomly assigned to 
the dockets between September 1, 1994, 
and January 31, 1996, and sentenced 
prior to June 30, 1997.16 They included 
346 eligible defendants on the treatment 
docket (140 treatment participants), 
365 eligible defendants on the graduated 
sanctions docket (240 program partici-
pants), and 311 eligible defendants on 
the standard docket. The sample groups 
were mostly black (96 percent) and 
male (85 to 89 percent). The median age 
ranged from 30 to 33 years old. More 
than two-thirds tested positive for a 
stronger drug (cocaine, heroin, or both) 
in the first 60 days of drug testing. 
Data on defendant outcomes included: 
• Drug use. Results of twice-weekly 
drug tests administered during pre-
trial release and self-report data. 
• Criminal activity. Records from 
the D.C. police and the FBI on 
arrests and self-report data. 
• Other outcomes. Social and eco-
nomic outcomes and postprogram 
use of services provided by self-
report data. 
The self-report data were collected 
from a personal survey with 482 
defendants conducted by the Gallup 
Exhibit 3. Eligibility for SCDIP evaluation sample 
Not Eligible for 
Sample 
• Case Dismissed 
n=43 (10%) 














Not Eligible for 
Sample 
• Case Dismissed 
n=47 (10%) 





1 Drug Users=468 







*Court and arrest records were available for all sample members. Survey data available for sample subset. 
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Organization 1 year after sentencing. 
The survey and records data were 
combined with court and program 
records on services delivered; results 
of focus group interviews with defen-
dants; and process evaluation findings 
based on observations, interviews with 
program staff and judges, and review 
of policies, procedures, and reports. 
A summary of impact evaluation find-
ings is shown in exhibit 4. Results of 
the impact evaluation of reductions 
in criminal activity were used to esti-
mate the benefits and returns to the 
programs in averted costs of crime. 
Reductions in drug use 
Both experimental programs significantly 
reduced defendants' drug use during 
pretrial release as compared to the stan-
dard docket. Program participants and 
nonparticipants on both the sanctions and 
treatment dockets were significantly more 
likely to test drug free in the month before 
sentencing, and a larger proportion of 
their tests were negative compared to the 
standard docket sample. The reductions 
in drug use were even more significant 
when only program participants were 
Not Eligible for 
Sample 
• Case Dismissed 
n=48 (12%) 





Eligible for Sample 
n=311 (79%) 
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Exhibit 4. Findings on the impact of the SCDIP graduated sanctions and treatment programsa 
Sanctions Treatment 
Program Sanctions Program Treatment 
Eligible Program Eligible Program 
Defendants Participants Defendants Participants 
(n=346) (n=240) (n=346) (n=140) 
Impact During the Program Period 
Reduced Drug Use 
• Tested Drug Free in Month Before Sentencingb P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.01 P<0.01 
• Percentage of Tests Dirty in Month Before Sentencing P<0.01 P<0.001 P<0.01 P<0.01 
Impact in the Year After Sentencing 
Reduced Drug Use 
• Any Self-Reported Use NS' NS (P<O.OS)d NS NS 
• Weekly Self-Reported Use NS NS NS NS 
Reduced Criminal Activity 
• Any Arrests NS p<0.05 NS NS 
• Any Drug Arrests NS NS NS NS 
• Any Violent Arrests NS NS NS NS 
• Any Property Arrests NS NS NS NS 
• Any Other Arrests NS NS NS NS 
• Number of Arrests NS NS NS NS 
• Number of Drug Arrests NS NS NS p<0.05 
• Number of Violent Arrests NS NS NS NS 
• Number of Property Arrests NS NS NS NS 
• Number of Other Arrests NS NS NS NS 
• Number of Arrests per Days on the Street NS p<0.05 NS NS 
• Any Self-Reported Offenses NS NS NS NS 
• Any Self-Reported Drug Offenses NS NS NS NS 
• Any Self-Reported Violent Offenses NS NS NS NS 
• Any Self-Reported Property Offenses NS NS NS NS 
• Any Other Self-Reported Offenses NS NS NS NS 
• Number of Self-Reported Offenses p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
• Number of Self-Reported Drug Offenses NS NS NS p<0.001 
• Number of Self-Reported Violent Offenses NS NS p<0.001 p<0.001 
• Number of Self-Reported Property Offenses NS NS p<0.001 p<0.001 
• Number of Other Self-Reported Offenses p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
Other Outcomes 
• Economic Gains NS NS NS NS 
• Reduction in Drug-Related Problems NS NS NS p<O.os• 
a The full report can be found on the Urban Institute Web site (www urban.org) under the authors' names This chart is intended to summarize the 
significant findings The report presents the full models and coefficients for each finding. 
b. Based on two tests per week per sa mple group. Defendants who dropped out of testing were counted as having two skipped tests per week . 
c. NS: Not Significant. 
d Sanctions program participants who also attended NA/AA were significantly less likely to use stronger drugs in the year after sentencing. 
e. Treatment program participants were significant ly less likely to have an accident with a veh icle while under the influence of drugs and less likely to have 
arguments while under the influence of drugs in the year after sentencing. 
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compared to the standard docket sample 
(see exhibit 5). 
Participants in the sanctions program 
and participants in the treatment pro-
grams were not significantly more 
likely to report use of drugs in the year 
after sentencing than defendants on 
the standard docket. However, the 
combination of sanctions and self-help 
treatment produced significant reduc-
tions in stronger drug use. Analysis of 
the interaction between sanctions 
program participation and attendance 
at NA/AA during the program period 
indicates the combination resulted in a 
significantly lower likelihood of heroin 
and/or cocaine use in the year after 
sentencing. 
Reductions in criminal activity 
Sanctions program participants were 
significantly less likely than the stan-
dard docket sample to be arrested in 
the year following sentencing (19 per-
cent compared to 27 percent). Most of 
the difference was in the form of a re-
duced likelihood of an arrest for a drug 
offense. Although the sanctions pro-
gram participants averaged 15 fewer 
days on the street in the year after sen-
tencing, this difference in the opportu-
nity to be arrested does not appear to be 
of sufficient magnitude to account for 
the differences in arrest rates. The esti-
mated per-day probability of arrest 
among the pooled group of experimen-
tal participants was 0.0006. Adjusting 
for the 15 days of extra risk among the 
standard docket defendants would 
lower their arrest rate to 26 percent but 
would not change the significance of 
the difference between the groups. The 
lower likelihood of arrest was consistent 
with the finding that sanctions program 
participants had more days on the street 
prior to their first arrest after sentenc-
ing than did the standard docket 
sample. 
Treatment participants were not signifi-
cantly less likely than standard docket 
defendants to be arrested in the year 
after sentencing, nor did they have more 
street days before first arrest during the 
year. However, they were significantly 
less likely to be arrested for a drug of-
fense than those on the standard docket. 
The full targeted sample of the eligible 
defendants on the experimental dockets 
did not show significant reductions in 
criminal activity measured by arrest 
records during the year after sentencing. 
There were significant reductions in the 
number of offenses reported by partici-
pants in both the treatment and sanc-
tions programs.17 Treatment participants 
reported significantly fewer offenses in 
all crime categories compared to the 
standard docket sample. Sanctions pro-
gram participants reported significantly 
fewer offenses overall and significantly 
fewer crimes in the "other offense" cat-
egory. These differences were also sig-
nificant when all eligible defendants on 
these dockets are compared to eligible 
defendants on the standard docket. 
Analysis of the validity of these esti-
mates against their arrest records and 
national estimates of the probability of 
arrest, given an offense, tend to call into 
question the validity of the self-report 
data for the treatment participants, but 
not for other sample members. About 
40 percent of the offenses repmted by 
the treatment participants were asso-
ciated with an official arrest record, 
while 5 percentorfeweroftheoffenses 
reported by the standard docket defen-
dants and sanctions participants were 
associated with arrests (similar to na-
tional evidence comparing arrests to 
victimization survey results). This sug-
gests the treatment participants under-
reported their criminal activity. 
The estimated value of reductions in 
arrests among sanctions program par-
ticipants was $1,493,194. These ben-
efits included reductions in the costs 
to victims and the reduced costs of 
arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. 
As a result, the sanctions program 
realized a net benefit of $713,570 






















* From court records. 
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after the additional costs of program 
services were deducted, a return of 
almost $2 for every $1 spent. 
Social and economic impacts 
Treatment program participants reported 
fewer drug-related social problems in the 
year after sentencing compared to the 
standard docket sample. These partici-
pants were less likely to have an acci-
dent with a car or other vehicle or argue 
with others while under the influence of 
drugs. However, there were no other sig-
nificant differences in social problems 
or economic status in the year after sen-
tencing when participants on the two 
experimental dockets were compared 
with defendants on the standard docket. 
Program costs 
The costs of operating the graduated 
sanctions and treatment programs were 
calculated as the difference in costs 
(incremental costs) between the sanc-
tions and standard dockets and the 
treatment and standard dockets. Pro-
gram cost categories included expendi-
tures paid out of project funds, including 
salaries, fringe benefits, supplies, con-
tractual services, and drug testing; court 
expenditures, including hearings for 
program participants; and below-market 
expenditures, including the in-kind 
costs of detoxification and jail space for 
those being sanctioned. 
The sanctions program cost of providing 
the case management, hearings, war-
rants, detoxification, jail space for those 
being sanctioned, additional drug tests, 
and other aspects of the program was 
estimated to be $3,248 per pa1ticipant 
($10.78 per day in the program). The 
treatment program cost of providing the 
treatment, hearings, additional drug 
tests, and supplementary services was 
estimated to be $8,708 per participant 
($21.01 per day in the program). 
The biggest cost item was personnel, 
accounting for 62 percent of the treat-
ment program costs and 43 percent of 
the sanctions program costs. Court ser-
vices accounted for 25 percent of the 
treatment program costs and 32 percent 
of the sanctions program costs. Because 
the court routinely used twice-weekly 
drug tests, the additional drug tests re-
quired by the programs amounted to a 
modest 9 percent of the treatment pro-
gram costs and 7 percent of the sanction 
program costs. For the sanctions pro-
gram, other costs such as jail space for 
sanctions, warrants, and detoxification 
amounted to 16 percent of the total. 
Interpreting the findings 
The findings indicate positive outcomes 
for participants in both of the experimen-
tal programs. However, these findings 
must be interpreted cautiously because 
program participation was voluntary and 
may have attracted defendants motivated 
to change. Although the analyses con-
trolled for differences in the type and 
severity of drug use and prior criminal 
history, the threat of selection bias cannot 
be ignored. 
In generalizing from the findings, it is 
important to note that the potential 
impact of the graduated sanctions and 
treatment programs in other jurisdictions 
may be underestimated. The standard 
docket in the D.C. Superior Court de-
voted much more attention to defendant 
drug use than many courts. Defendants 
who tested positive for drugs at arrest 
were tested twice a week during pretrial 
release. The judges on this docket fre-
quently referred to drug test results on 
their computers and encouraged defen-
dants who continued to use drugs to seek 
treatment. Because the D.C. Superior 
Court already had these services in 
place for both the treatment and control 
populations, any crime reduction that 
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resulted from these activities would not 
have been captured. The finding that the 
number of crimes committed by these 
drug-involved felony defendants in 
the year after sentencing was lower by 
several hundred crimes per year than 
reported by addicts in other studies 
suggests the level of supervision and 
services provided exercised a substantial 
deterrent effect on all dockets.18 Simi-
larly, standard docket defendants' 
relatively high rates of voluntary partici-
pation in community-based drug treat-
ment may have resulted from the judicial 
encouragement and reduced their drug 
use and criminal activity. 
The evaluation is not a robust test of 
the potential of treatment given the 
problems encountered in implement-
ing the program. Subsequent evalua-
tion of a well-implemented treatment 
program is needed before it can be 
concluded that treatment in a pretrial 
setting has such modest effects on 
defendant behavior. 
Jurisdictions that do not currently have 
a drug testing program or encourage 
judicial monitoring of drug use, none-
theless, can expect costs for imple-
menting similar programs to be higher 
than those in Washington. The program 
cost estimates presented in this docu-
ment account for the additional expen-
ditures for the sanctions and treatment 
services (including additional drug 
tests) but do not include the costs of the 
basic testing and the very sophisticated 
computer system in place to support the 
comt. For similar reasons, jurisdictions 
without computerized records of test re-
sults and active judicial involvement 
might expect to see additional signifi-
cant impacts of program operation. 
The impacts reported must also be 
considered in light of the characteris-
tics of the eligible population targeted 
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for intervention, which consisted of all 
defendants charged with drug felonies. 
Unlike many drug courts that exclude 
defendants convicted of a violent 
offense or facing pending charges for 
a violent offense (required for Federal 
drug court funding), the programs were 
open to those individuals with long 
criminal histories as well as first of-
fenders. Unlike many drug courts, the 
program was not limited to addicts 
because eligibility for the program was 
based on drug test results, not indi-
vidualized assessments of addiction. 
As a result, the program participants 
varied widely in the severity and dura-
tion of their drug use. 
Lessons for court-based drug 
intervention programs 
One important lesson from the sanc-
tions program was the effectiveness of 
combining treatment and sanctions. 
Both the treatment and graduated sanc-
tions programs reduced drug use during 
the period of supervision. However, the 
results indicate more lasting effects can 
he achieved by combining graduated 
sanctions with voluntary participation 
in NA/AA, as evidenced by the lower 
likelihood of heroin and cocaine use 
in the year after sentencing among the 
defendants receiving both. 
The results also point to the importance 
of getting the defendants' up-front 
commitment to the rules. In the focus 
group, sanction program participants 
said they agreed in advance to the sanc-
tions and the rules for applying penalties 
because it gave them a feeling of control 
and a sense they were treated fairly. 
These defendants knew they could avoid 
penalties by not using drugs, and it was 
their responsibility to show the judge 
they were clean through drug test re-
sults. This "contingency contract" he-
tween the judge and defendant clearly 
differentiates these sanctions from im-
posed penalties using poorly understood 
or inconsistently enforced rules. 
The twice-weekly drug tests were a 
relatively inexpensive strategy for 
screening defendants for drug use in a 
timely manner. The majority of those 
failing two drug tests did so within a 
month to 6 weeks of arrest. Using tests 
as a screening process enabled the 
intervention programs to devote their 
staff resources to conducting individu-
alized assessments (in the treatment 
program) or seeking community-based 
treatment programs (in the sanctions 
program) for those defendants known 
to use drugs. By focusing assessments 
on the subset of known users, the court 
identified a diverse and relatively 
large group of drug-involved offenders. 
Strong and cohesive leadership was im-
portant to the success of the programs. 
The judges' commitment to program 
implementation was one of the strengths 
of the experimental demonstration. 
Judges are reassigned annually in 
Washington, and the drug felony dockets 
were treated as one of the regular assign-
ments. A total of nine judges-three per 
docket-presided during the demon-
stration period. Despite the expected 
diversity in style (some were viewed by 
defendants as stricter than others, some 
as friendlier than others), all performed 
effectively in these assignments, closely 
followed the program procedures, ac-
tively participated in monthly meetings 
to discuss procedures and issues, and 
collahoratively worked to solve problems 
and modify procedures as needed across 
the entire period of the demonstration. 
The judges met monthly with representa-
tives of the U.S. Attorney's Office, public 
defenders, and the pretrial and probation 
agencies. This group has continued to 
meet and guide drug court interventions 
for the D.C. Superior Court. 
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